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ABSTRACT
The main concern of this paper is whether Hume’s account of belief has a normative di-
mension, especially concerning his account of general rules of reasoning in his Treatise of 
Human Nature, and consequently, whether it is possible to offer an account of the norma-
tive force of those rules in spite of his naturalist framework. I conclude that there are many 
normative elements in his conception of belief and reasoning, and that, as many authors 
in recent studies of normativity have suggested, naturalism can sufficiently account for the 
normative structures of our cognition and their normative authority. Such a view of the 
normative dimension of belief in Hume’s epistemology also shows an interesting and close 
connection with the moral dimension of his thought, which I believe is of fundamental im-
portance for understanding his thought in general.    
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RESUMO
O principal objetivo deste artigo é discutir se o relato da crença de Hume tem uma dimen-
são normativa, especialmente no que se refere ao seu relato de regras gerais de raciocínio 
em seu Tratado da Natureza Humana e, consequentemente, se é possível explicar a força 
normativa destas regras apesar de sua estrutura naturalista. Concluo que há muitos ele-
mentos normativos em sua concepção de crença e raciocínio e que, como muitos autores 
de estudos recentes de normatividade sugeriram, o naturalismo pode explicar as estruturas 
normativas de nossa cognição e sua autoridade normativa. Esta visão da dimensão nor-
mativa da crença na epistemologia de Hume também mostra uma conexão interessante 
e próxima com a dimensão moral de seu pensamento, que acredito ser de fundamental 
importância para a compreensão de seu pensamento em geral.
Palavras-chave: Hume, regras gerais, normatividade, crença.
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In recent decades, Hume’s apparent concern for norma-
tive issues in his philosophical writings has been of increas-
ing interest among scholars (see Hearn, 1970, 1976; Martin, 
1993, Falkenstein, 1997; Lyons, 2001; Searjeantson, 2005; 
Morris, 2006; Schliesser, 2007). One of the main questions 
seems to be whether his account of general rules in his Trea-
tise and subsequent writings is an expression of normative 
claims concerning epistemic and moral judgment, or, on the 
contrary, whether appealing to rules is nothing more than a 
careless use of normative language within a naturalist frame-
work, which cannot provide a foundation for the normative 
force of epistemic rules (see Lyons, 2001, p. 270, 273, n. 14; 
Falkenstein, 1997, p. 30).
Even from the very beginning of the discussion one could 
call the matter a “pseudo problem” based on an anachronism. 
In fact, the concern with rules was common throughout ear-
ly modern philosophy, at least since Descartes’s Regulae ad 
directionem ingenii, and e ecially in early modern logic2 (see 
Easton, 1997; Serjeantson, 2005, p. 188), while normativity is 
itself a 20th-century concern of philosophers.
In this paper, I will be dealing with some difficulties 
concerning how to articulate a normative view of Hume’s 
account of general rules. In order to do this, I will try to sup-
port the following three claims: (i) Hume uses the concept 
of rules in at least three different ways, one of which is nor-
mative in a strong sense. To support this statement it will 
be necessary to recall what a general rule is and to examine 
its relation to belief and normativity; (ii) If there is a source 
of the normative force of general rules in Hume’s thought, 
then this means that the theory is in itself normative, even 
though neither the general rules nor their normativity are 
explicit subjects of analysis in the Treatise, but instead serve 
as operative concepts; and (iii) Hume’s novel view of philos-
ophy and reason explain to some extent the generation of 
normative structures in his philosophy.
Rules in Hume’s philosophy
That Hume’s thought is concerned with the prob-
lem of rules in its central parts has been well known since 
Hearn’s two papers on general rules from the 1970’s, in 
which he shows that general rules play a systematic role 
in the Treatise, being present in each of its three books 
(Hearn, 1970, p. 404-4063). In this paper, however, I will 
be dealing only with the problem of the normativity of 
general rules in Hume’s epistemology, mostly in part 3 of 
book 1 of the Treatise. There we find for the first time an 
extensive exposition of general rules and their influence on 
our judgment and belief.
General rules are, as described by Hume in T 1.34, gen-
eralizations concerning the behavior of a kind of phenome-
non of our experience that can be expressed by proposition 
in the form “every X is/has the property/ is predicable-of Y”. 
This kind of general statement appears within the analysis of 
probabilities, for they lack the universality of mathematical 
and logical propositions and they cannot be demonstrated (as 
Hume understands the term, probabilities are both our be-
liefs of matters of fact, as well as the statements themselves 
that articulate such beliefs). Instead, they are conveyed by 
the imagination’s tendency to generalize, based on past ex-
perience and custom. Nonetheless, not every generalization 
has the same status, and this fact reinforces the distinction 
commonly drawn in the secondary literature between gen-
eral rules of prejudices (also referred to as “extensive general 
rules”) and the so-called corrective general rules.
The way in which general rules affect our judgment is 
also addressed by Hume in his treatment of probability in the 
Treatise since it also belongs to the topic of belief and belief-for-
mation mechanisms. According to Hume, a belief is a “strong 
and steady conception of an idea” that includes a claim to truth 
and with a number of different causes, such as memory, imag-
ination, and causal inference: “we join belief to the conception, 
and are perswaded of the truth of what we conceive” (T 1.3.7; 
SBN 96-7 footnote). Hume naturally endorses some of those 
mechanisms which are in a better position to fulfill that ex-
pectation (see Loeb, 2002, p. 13) and prevent our ideas from 
being the mere “offspring of the imagination” (see T 1.3.9.4; 
SBN 108). Besides, considering the probability of causes, Hume 
holds that our judgments take place by virtue of custom and 
general rules (see T 1.3.12.24; SBN 141), and that “custom can 
lead us into false comparison of ideas” (T 1.3.9.17; SBN 116. 
See also T 1.3.13.2; SBN 143-144), e ecially when we, as a re-
sult of the imagination’s propensity to generalize, form general 
rules of the following type: “An Irishman cannot have wit, and 
a Frenchman cannot have solidity”. This kind of judgment is 
called an “unphilosophical  ecies of probability” and “is that 
deriv’d from general rules, which we rashly form to ourselves, 
and which are the source of what we properly call prejudice” (T 
1.3.13.7; SBN 146; for another example see T 2.2.5.12-13; SBN 
362). This first kind of general rule leads to false reasoning in 
so far as the rule is caused by the “propensity of the imagination 
to extend the scope of judgments formed in one set of circum-
stances to other resembling but non-identical circumstances” 
(Hearn, 1970, p. 405).
2 See for example Hutcheson, Logicae Compendium (1756), Watts, Logic (1724) or Arnauld et al., La Logique ou l’art de penser (2011 
[1662]). The latter works were probably very well known by Hume.
3 Hearn barely mentions the issue of the value of general esthetic judgment, which Railton addresses (2000, p. 10-16)  
4 I cite Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature (T) according to the critical edition of Oxford Philosophical Texts by D. Norton and M. Nor-
ton, using the abbreviation T and four numbers (book, part, section, paragraph) and according to the traditional edition of Sellby-Bi-
gge/Nidditch using the abbreviation SBN followed by the number of the page. In all quotations of Hume’s work, I respect the original 
orthography.
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Although every judgment on probability is a function 
of custom, i.e. past experience and the projection of the 
imagination, the mind is not condemned to follow its faulty 
natural tendencies. It is possible to prevent the mind from 
forming false beliefs founded on rules of prejudices and from 
“the reposing any assurance in those momentary glimpses of 
light, which arise in the imagination from a feign’d resem-
blance and contiguity” (T 1.3.9.6; SBN 110), by means of the 
reflective mediation of second level judgments.5 Thus, the 
same propensity of the imagination to generalize can result 
in “philosophical probability” when it is mediated by reflec-
tion. Reflection is a pivotal element in Hume’s account of 
mental a ivity, it explains some a ects of our cognition by 
playing a twofold roll: transforming some instances of the 
generalization tendency of the imagination into patterns of 
adequate judgments, i.e. proper “general rules”; but it also 
distinguishes, by means of correction, between those cases 
that are in accordance with those rules. That is why Hume 
suggests that mediation in judgment leads to the so-called 
corrective general rules, which are allowed “to influence 
their judgments <of men> even contrary to present obser-
vation and experience” (T 1.3.13.8; SBN 147, clarification 
added). In a very central passage for this investigation Hume 
claims that
We shall afterwards take notice of some 
general rules, by which we ought to reg-
ulate our judgment concerning causes and 
effects; and these rules are form’d on the 
nature of our understanding, and on our ex-
perience of its operations in the judgments 
we form concerning objects. By them we 
learn to distinguish the accidental circum-
stances from the efficacious causes [...] The 
general rule is attributed to our judgment; 
as being more extensive and constant6 (T 
1.3.13.11; SBN 149, emphasis added).
Hume continues: “Sometimes the one, sometimes the 
other prevails, according to the disposition and character 
of the person. The vulgar are commonly guided by the first, 
and wise men by the second <kind of rules>” (T 1.3.13.12; 
SBN 150). It seems that the character of the beliefs a per-
son forms, that is, the way someone structures his or her 
doxastic life, reflects the extent to which he or she is ac-
tually influenced by epistemic norms, the extent to which 
his or her beliefs express rationality or irrationality.7 Thus 
for Hume, the rational epistemic agent is the one who is 
able to assume a critical philosophical perspective. A wise 
person is someone whose beliefs are reliably formed due to 
a reliable disposition to judge reflectively, and justified for 
the same reason (setting aside the problem of the criteria 
for justification of belief ). This is because, according to the 
corrective general rules account, a rational belief not only 
expresses a healthy mental attitude of a believer, but it is 
also somehow related to the content of the beliefs.8 Thus, 
according to Hume, more extensive and constant experi-
ence is “of a grosser and more stubborn nature, less subject 
to accidents, and less influenced by whim and private fan-
cy” (Essays9 1. XIV, p. 112; G&G, p. 175).10 An extended 
and constant experience of the same phenomenon or kind 
of phenomenon in the light of certain evidence (copy prin-
ciple) is of a nature that can be expressed by general rules: 
“But however intricate they may seem, it is certain that 
general principles, if just and sound, must always prevail in 
the general course of things, though they may fail in par-
ticular cases; and it is the chief business of philosophers 
5 The first use of reflection in the Treatise concerns impressions. Thus Hume distinguishes between first order perceptions – also called 
impressions or ideas of sensation, which are directly related to sense perception – and second order perceptions, that is, impressions 
and ideas of reflection that result from the affection produced by the mind on itself. This kind of perception implicitly recalls some kind 
of self-consciousness or self-experience as a source of representations. This distinction seems similar to the one that Hume is accused 
of making in his appeal to reflection at the level of judgments. Those general statements that the mind proceeds to form without any 
mediation of reflection, and which can be false (the case of prejudices) or, and may also be subject to a second order judgment which 
can only arise as a result of reflection. Wilson (2008, p. 416) grasps the chief role of reflection in Hume’s thought, writing that for Hume 
“the mind arrives at standards of rationality through a process of reflection upon the world as it is experienced and, equally importantly, 
upon itself as it is experienced”.
6 Constancy and extensiveness are criteria for justifications and rationality of belief. But these terms belong more properly to a cluster of 
terms; frequency, stability, and stubbornness are also to be mentioned. (For the discussion of these criteria see Lyons, 2001; Loeb, 2001; 
Guerrero del Amo, 2005, for three different positions). These concepts are the fruit of reflection, in so far as they arise from the analysis 
and abstraction of properties of our experience. Furthermore, reflection is a topic of great relevancy in current discussions about belief 
and normativity (Owens, 2000).
7 This is what Owens calls the problem of “doxastic control” (2003, p. 284). For a discussion of epistemic norms in Hume, see Lyons 
(2001). He distinguishes between “criteria for epistemic norm correctness” and the “defense of the criteria”. This is an important dis-
tinction that is assumed in this paper.
8 It appears that Hume’s theory of justification of belief includes an interesting confluence of different elements of reliabilism, coherent-
ism and fundationalism.
9 I quote both Eugen Miller edition (1985) and T.H. Green and T.H. Grosse (G&G) edition (1889): Essay part 1, XIV: Of the Rise and Prog-
ress of the Arts and Sciences. Essay part 2, I:  Of Commerce.
10 I agree that there is a doctrinal continuity between Hume’s Treatise and the subsequent Essays. Immerwahr (1991) shows the harmonic 
continuity and coherence of both works, and moreover, the complementing nature of both approaches to human nature and business.
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to regard the general course of things” (Essays 2. I, p. 254; 
G&G, p. 287)11.
As we can see above, there is an underlying connection 
between what can properly be an object of our knowledge 
and the method that can leads a reasoner to that knowledge; 
a connection that we can make sense of only by appealing to 
Hume’s account of general rules. Along this path, I argue that 
in order to fully understand the aforementioned connection, 
it is necessary to distinguish not two (as has been often done), 
but three different categories within the concept of “gener-
al rule”. Firstly, there are extensive general rules of prejudice. 
Secondly, there are general principles, which are, so to  eak, 
materially determined, for they express  ecific properties or 
chara eristics of phenomena (in physics, politics, econom-
ics, moral, for example) and correspond to the distinction 
between “what is owing to chance, and what proceeds from 
causes” (Essays 1. XIV, p. 111; G&G, p. 174; also T 1.3.11.12; 
SBN 128-9) or, according to Hume, “between particular de-
liberation and general reasoning” (Essays 2. I p. 254). The 
conditions for the achievement of this kind of knowledge12 
– which corresponds to Hume’s philosophical probability – are 
“the greater refinements and improvements of human rea-
son” (Essays 1. XIV, p. 118; G&G, p. 180). This also supports 
Hume’s claim that politics, metaphysics and morals “form the 
most considerable branches of science. Mathematics and nat-
ural philosophy, which only remain, are not half so valuable” 
(Essays 1. XIV, p. 126; G&G, p. 186). These first two kinds of 
rules make space for the third, the one we have been calling 
“corrective”. These general rules are “the logic” of probable rea-
soning and is required to achieve justified and reliable belief, 
on which all valuable sciences are based. Corrective general 
rules have therefore at least a threefold function: (1) they dis-
play a model of reliable belief formation and correction; (2) 
they can also correct judgment produced by the first kind of 
general rules (T 1.3.13.12; SBN 149-50); and (3) they make it 
possible to return irreflective judgment or belief to its cogni-
tive sources and foundations and, thus, to identify false belief 
as such (see T 1.3.8.14; SBN 104-5).
General rules for 
causal reasoning
After developing his theory of philosophical probabili-
ties and its dependency on causal inference, Hume outlined 
his famous set of Rules by which to judge causes and effects (T 
1.3.15; SBN 173). They are 8 criteria that allow us to distin-
guish between a relation of constant conjunction that de-
scribes a causal nexus and an apparent causal relation. They 
should permit us to discern the correctness of inferences and 
beliefs based on causal reasoning. Furthermore, Hume affirms 
that the 8 rules are “all the logic I think proper to employ in 
my reasoning” (T 1.3.15.11; SBN 175). They should rule our 
causal reasoning so that they resemble as much as possible the 
Proof13 horizon. The general rules for causal reasoning are the 
natural conclusion of Hume’s treatment of probabilities and 
probable belief in the Treatise (and not the skeptical conclu-
sion of T 1.4). This is not only because of the plain fact that, 
according to Hume, every reasoning concerning matters of 
fact relies on causal inference, but also and mostly, because 
despite this reliance “the relation of cause and effect has all the 
opposite advantages” compared to reasoning based on “feign’d 
resemblance and contiguity” since “the objects it presents are 
fixt and unalterable” (T 1.3.9.7; SBN 110). There are many 
other principles that enlivened our ideas similarly bringing us 
to believe “and command our assent beyond what experience 
will justify; which can proceed from nothing beside the re-
semblance between ideas and facts” (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 113), 
for example, credulity (“easy faith in the testimony of other”) 
and education, which rest “almost on the same foundation of 
custom and repetition as our experience or reasoning from 
causes and effects” (T 1.3.9.19; SBN 117). As a result, accura-
cy in the determination of causes is needed to avoid the “in-
accuracy”, which is “contrary to true philosophy” (T 1.3.9.19 
footnote; SBN 117). The corrective principles for causal rea-
soning, which are “a true  ecies of reasoning and the stron-
gest” (T 1.3.7 footnote), are all the logic necessary in order to 
“rectify non philosophical probabilities into causal probabili-
ties” thus achieving a true philosophy, upon which, according 
to Hume’s project, depends the real possibility of reaching “a 
system of proofs,”14 or in other words: science.
As can be seen, this set of rules has a unique chara er. 
Since cause and effect is, properly  eaking, the only relation 
of matters of fact that results in reasoning (T 1.3.2; SBN 73) 
– that is, drawing a conclusion from given premises, or the 
generation of new beliefs from given ones – the rules for judg-
ing cause and effect relations have to mediate this process of 
forming beliefs in order for that judgment to be an expression 
of an adequacy between the natural tendency of the mind 
and the “stubborn nature” of the object of its judgment, both 
of which are necessary for developing science. They rectify 
judgments in so far as they evaluate if they are “subject to ac-
cidents or influenced by whim and private fancy” (Essays 1. 
XIV, p. 112; G&G, p. 175).
11 See also the following quotation from the Treatise “in order to establish a general rule, and extent it beyond its proper bounds, there 
is requir’d a certain uniformity in our experience, and a great superiority of those instances, which are conformable to the rule, above 
the contrary” (T 2.2.5.12-13; SBN 362).
12 I am using the word in its general sense and not specifically in reference to the demonstrative scope of reasoning.
13 For the meaning of this concept in Hume’s thought see T 1.3.11.2; SBN 124.
14 Saltel (1999, p. 44, the English translation is my own) “redresser les probabilités non philosophiques en probabilités causales, ou en 
système de preuves”.
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That is why I ultimately think Hume’s account of cor-
rective general rules, though terminologically akin to the use 
of modern logic, is different in nature in so far as it is the result 
of an inquiry into the deep nature of believing and judging. 
Those rules are not mere recommendations or simply an in-
strument for reaching certainty. They represent instead the 
structure of a corrected natural faculty of reason; in other 
words: a standard. Precisely on this point rests the origin of 
their normativity15. I agree with Hearn’s claim that “these rules 
come for Hume to occupy a different status [...] the function 
of the causal rules is to correct and stabilize the sentiment 
of belief which is generated by certain natural, causal factors” 
(1976, p. 65). It seems to be the case that corrective general 
rules are normative rather than descriptive, that is, they are 
prescriptions about how we ought to form and correct states 
of belief. Now, this is still insufficient to prove that general 
rules have normative force, indeed, someone could insist that 
Hume is just describing the way we form more stubborn and 
reliable beliefs, as he did with false beliefs. Hence the import-
ant issue here is to determine the extent to which the account 
of general rules belongs to this level of discourse, that is to 
say, whether the rules are meant to account for the doctrine 
of natural causes of belief or if there is something else to say 
about them.
General rules and the normative 
dimension of belief
The question concerning the normative dimension of 
belief runs into the intricate relationship between belief and 
truth. This relationship can be described as follows: to believe 
that p is to believe that p is true. Thus, prima facie, a correct 
belief, that is, one that fulfills that pretension, is ultimately a 
true belief16. It follows, therefore, that a rational agent should 
believe p if and only if, there is enough evidence for the truth 
of p. The same would apply for the case of rules: if A, B and 
C are principles for forming true beliefs, it follows that in rea-
soning (coming to a correct conclusion) we have to consider 
beliefs that are consistent with those rules to be more reliable 
than ones that are not.17
Yet by itself, this relationship does not seem adequate 
to account for the source of normativity of belief. In fact, the 
assumption outlined in the above paragraph is exactly what 
needs to be proved here. For even if belief aims at truth, the 
following naturalist objection cannot be easily avoided: “To 
elevate this trivial fact to the status of a ‘norm’ is to transform 
an innocent platitude into a pompous falsehood. For there is 
nothing normative about believing: neither we believe with 
an eye fixed on the horizon of an ideal of truth nor we obey 
any prescription to believe the truth” (Engel, 2007, p. 179)18. 
In other words, the relation that our beliefs have to truth can 
be seen as a plain fact; it expresses the fact wherein one be-
lieves p, rather than a compulsory prescription about what 
to believe.
I would like to draw attention to the problem concern-
ing the scope of normativity as a first step to present my re-
sponse to the naturalist objection. Normativity, at least in a 
philosophical sense, is not mere necessity (logical or physi-
cal). Rather, it concerns what is not absolutely necessary and, 
accordingly, it would be pointless to attach in any way nor-
mativity to a plain fact as breathing or sunshine. The proper 
scope of normativity, in the sense I am intere ed in, is that 
of pra ice (see, for example, Stemmer, 2008, p. 32; Railton 
in Dancy, 2000, p. 4). If believing and breathing are not two 
different kinds of phenomenon I would agree that there is 
no point in ascribing normativity to the realm of belief. But 
I think that there is certainly a difference between them, in 
so far as belief is the result a typical kind of agency, namely, 
epistemic agency, which involves other typical components 
of the realm of normative facts, such as judgment, will, epis-
temic freedom and, in short, rationality. Now, the claim that 
believing is a subject of the will is – for good reason – contro-
versial (see Owens, 2000), and though I cannot address this 
controversy here, I will instead, assume a position very close 
to McDowell’s (1998, p. 434f) and O’Hagan’s (2005, p. 45f), 
15 Lyons rejects the claim that the general rules for causal reasoning are second order mental states, evident by their reflective character 
(T 1.3.13.11; SBN 149). Instead he holds that they are about objects (Lyons, 2001, p. 273, n. 13). I believe Lyons’s claim is wrong since 
according to Hume causation cannot be objectively predicated on objects, but only as a projective function of the intellectual power of 
men. General rules are explicitly rules “to judge”, thus, they refer to acts of the mind rather than to objects. Nevertheless, I agree with 
Lyons that they are reflective in the sense that they involve the idea of causation, which is an idea of reflection.
16 In a deeper analysis this claim has to be qualified. Epistemic norms are in a sense standards of correctness of belief. Norms governing 
beliefs are nonetheless still related to their characteristic aim: truth. Nevertheless from the perspective of real epistemic agency, believ-
ing is not necessarily a matter of “all or nothing”, but of degrees of rationality, certainty, correctness, evidence, assurance, confidence. 
This is also something that Hume has permanently in mind while dealing with probability (see for example T 1.3.7.2; SBN 130-31, 
1.3.13.2; SNB 143). For Hume, different degrees of evidence constitute important epistemic distinctions, as is the case, for example, 
between probability and proof. For Hume there are some states of belief which are justified, and that justification is a function of their 
sources (if they are reliable or not), their stability and the dispositions of the epistemic agent to believe
17 For further developments on this issue see, in particular, Stemmer (2008, p. 77-79, 99). For the topic of normativity and epistemic 
norms, as well as norms of truth, see Lyon (2001), Owens (2003, p. 285-289) and Engel (2007, p. 182 ff).
18 The objection is formulated by Engel, although he does not contend it. For a contrary position see O’Hagan (2005, p. 44) and Stem-
mer (2008). Basically, these authors will sustain a “constitutive argument” in the sense that, as Stemmer for example put it, “it appears 
that the will-to-be-rational is an intrinsic goal of reasoning” (“Es kommt hinzu, dass das Rational-sein-wollen ein intrinsisches Telos des 
Überlegens ist”, Stemmer, 2008, p. 60, the English translation is of my own).
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in the sense that even if belief is not typically the result of our 
deciding what to believe, its occurrence is inseparable from, 
even constitutive of, the exercise of judgment, which cannot 
take place outside of the space of reasons.
Hence, in so far as freedom and rationality are involved 
in how we structure our doxastic lives, there are prima facie 
good reasons to assume that there is also a normative dimen-
sion involved. Hume’s theory penetrates this dimension by 
moving from a descriptive account of natural causes of belief 
formation to a deeper level, where reflective mechanisms of 
belief correction and formation reveal that belief is not a mere 
mechanical response19, but also a matter of rational deliber-
ation. Corrective general rules are mechanisms of reflective 
thinking, directed to judgment and, therefore, standards of 
rational thinking. Now, standards belong naturally to the 
pra ice of reasoning itself, but they only become explicit if we 
assume a critical per ective and pay attention to what un-
derlies the mere possibility of the pra ice. Reflection shows 
that it is inherent to epistemic agency to be normative, and 
this fact does not contradict in any measure the fact that real 
epistemic agents are most of the time insensible to their being 
“responsive” to reasons.
Corrective general rules are called upon to determine the 
standards of correction of causal judgment, and with it, the 
standards of correction of belief. A belief, accordingly, can be 
more or less adequate, depending on the degree of evidence 
and experience available. Furthermore, general rules help to 
determine the level of adequacy, since those experiences that 
can be captured (let themselves be explained) by general rules 
are what concerns science. It is important to keep this point 
in mind. Given a statement, there are certain conditions un-
der which it should or should not be believed, that is, taken as 
true. Nonetheless, these conditions, according to my reading of 
Hume’s epistemology, are deeply related to a demarcation cri-
terion, much more than a truth theory. A belief can report dif-
ferent levels of certainty, depending on its nearness to the poof 
horizon. Proofs are basically beliefs for which there has been 
no exception in experience, which is what general rules try to 
secure. We also know that Hume believes that those rules are 
“very easy in their invention, but extremely difficult in their ap-
plication” (T 1.3.15.11; SBN 175). In my opinion, the account 
of general rules is far from being about how to ensure that one’s 
belief is true, as is the case with Descartes, for example; rather, it 
concerns the conditions under which a doxastic item can count 
as knowledge in Hume’s “liberalized” non-rationalistic sense, 
which somewhat “divorces questions of justification from ques-
tions of truth” (Lyons, 2001, p. 270)20.
All this however, does not solve the problem of the nor-
mative force of epistemic rules, as guide of processes of belief 
formation and justification, i.e., why should we follow these 
rules, and where does their normative constraint lie.
Normative force
General rules are corrective, in so far as they state the 
standard of certain knowledge of causes. Furthermore, since 
generalization is a natural tendency of the mind, it follows that 
general rules are the consummation, the telos, of such a natu-
ral tendency. In other words, nobody expects or intends to fail 
at reasoning (in the broad, Humean sense of the word), even 
when the roots of that reasoning are not actually present to the 
mind. Everyone assumes that he or she reasons correctly – at 
least aspires to reason correctly – and thereby, that the beliefs 
he or she forms are correct, in the same sense that believing 
p necessarily involves believing its truth. Believing, as well as 
reasoning, aim at truth as their intrinsic condition. Since causal 
reasoning (or causal inference or generalization) is inevitable, 
and since it naturally involves the intention of truth, it follows 
that everyone must reason in accordance with general rules. 
In other words, “the authority of reasons is found within the 
pra ice of reasoning itself. We reasoners are bound by rational 
standards because to engage in reasoning just is to be account-
able to rational standards” (O’Hagan, 2005, p. 43). Specifical-
ly, since all matter of fact reasoning is a causal reasoning, one 
ought to pay heed to the 8 causal rules by which one may judge 
cause and effect in order to avoid false beliefs21.
I claim that believing and belief formation by probable 
reasoning would constitute in themselves what Peter Stem-
mer has called a “normative situation” (Stemmer, 2008, §4), 
that is, a situation in which a normative ought-ness is implied, 
even if that situation is not epistemically present to the agent. 
The situation can be described as a hypothetical statement: 
“if we wish to achieve correct beliefs, we should reason ac-
cording to some G rules”. If we wish the end, we are “norma-
tively” required to act – to reason – in a certain way. The aim 
at truth of belief configures, so to  eak, the normative situa-
tion. Now, for general rules to have normative force, it must 
be a condition that we do wish to have correct beliefs, so that 
they express not merely descriptive value, but also normative 
authority. This leads to the following question: why should 
we want to have true beliefs? Why should we be motivated to 
reason according to general rules?
I think Hume also has an answer to this question, a ques-
tion that is deeply connected with his naturalist conception 
of human reasoning: we need to reason correctly, because as 
agents we desire things, and in order to reach what we want, we 
need to identify the efficient means for obtaining them. Correct 
causal reasoning is a necessary condition for achieving the ends 
19 Hume is often taken as the paradigmatic case of an author who neglects the existence of intellectual freedom. See, for example, the 
introduction of Owens’ work (2000).
20 But only somewhat, as Martin has noted (1993, p. 256). Both authors use the same texts as support, see T 1.4.7.14; SBN 272.
21 Indeed, the 8 rules are not the only epistemic norms of Hume’s epistemology. Besides logical principles, the so-called copy principle 
deserves particular attention. See, for example, Schliesser (2007).
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we desire; thus, being responsible epistemic agents by reasoning 
according to basic epistemic norms is something we must do in 
order to satisfy our desire. This is also, according to Hume, the 
primary reason for why we engage in reasoning. Science and 
truth are secondary targets of reasoning, but certainly not of 
less importance; the first target, however, is instrumental. This 
conclusion shows, moreover, how deeply Hume’s epistemology 
is oriented to his Moral theory, and that an understanding of 
Hume’s account of reasoning and general rules sheds light on 
those passages in book 2 and 3 which at first sight seem to con-
flict with the “skeptical conclusion” of book 1 (see for example, 
T 2.3.3.6/7; SBN 416, T 2.3.10.1; SBN 449, T 3.1.1; SBN 458-9. 
In the secondary literature see e ecially Winters, 1979).
But since much of our causal reasoning is not conscious, 
most people do not manage to know that they have to follow 
general rules in order to reason correctly, for this a ivity is 
already normative oriented. Even if they recognize that they 
have to reason carefully and according to general rules, they 
may choose not to do it, because they are influenced by other 
passions. But this is another matter, which has to do with ra-
tional deliberations and rational decisions.
Lyons (2001, p. 270) has argued that “the normativity in 
Hume’s epistemology” lies in that “the philosophical method 
derives its greater value from being a better means of satis-
fying curiosity (and keeping it satisfied) as well as meeting 
other, daily, pragmatic ends”. I consider this to be correct, but 
instead of under-valuating it as a case of just “instrumental-
ly-inspired” normativity, I believe, with Stemmer (2008, p. 
33-44), that the source of normative ought-ness is – in most 
cases, at least – a relation of “necessary condition” to which 
is attached a wish/desire/want that actualizes the norma-
tive force of the condition22 in as much as not following it, 
necessarily means not achieving what is desired. Here rests 
one of the most important of Hume’s legacies: we are not able 
to deeply understand (even) our most abstra ive cognitive 
processes without reference to the affective scope of human 
nature. In other words, there is an a ive exchange between 
the “sensitive” and the “cogitative” part of our nature. This ex-
change also takes place in the constitution of the normative, as 
described by Fred Wilson: “Reflecting upon [...] experience 
we adopt goals that are attainable and means that are effi-
cient. Self-reflection leads to standards of pra ice that define 
the (cognitive) virtue of rationality; it leads to standards that 
are attainable and efficient. In other words, self-reflection 
leads to a reasonable standard of rationality. Or at least, it 
does so if one is wise” (2008, p. 416).   
Conclusion
The rudimentary tools with which Hume’s philosophy 
and epistemology is equipped make it, at first sight, look very 
unfit to be a contribution to the actual debate concerning 
epistemic normativity. However, his account of corrective 
general rules provides a more or less persuasive account of the 
sources of the normative dimension in belief formation and 
correction, and it also provides a solution to the problem con-
cerning motivation. Hume’s ideas seem to be supportive of 
certain ways of addressing the issue of normativity and epis-
temic agency, namely, constitutive strategies. Reflection thus 
uncovers the normative structure of belief itself, and belief ’s 
aiming at truth implies a normative relation between epis-
temic norms and doxastic items. That is the way I think we 
have to understand Hume’s claim that there are some “general 
rules, by which we ought to regulate our judgment concern-
ing causes and effects; and these rules are form’d on the nature 
of our understanding, and on our experience of its operations in 
the judgments we form concerning objects”. But also the origin of 
their normative force is uncovered as lying ultimately in the 
inner psychology of human nature, deeply embedded in the 
fa icity of life. For Hume, believing rightly, that is, believing 
what is “more probably” true, is determined significantly by 
utility, and by passions like the love of truth and curiosity. Now, 
as he stresses, “the question is after what manner this utility and 
importance operate upon us?” (T 2.3.10.4; SBN 450). This issue 
is no longer a question for epistemology, but instead for the 
science of man as a whole. Natural dispositions, psychological 
mechanisms of the mind, and social and cultural construc-
tions are called upon to answer it.  
All these nuances seem to configure the normative di-
mension of Hume’s epistemology, which from the very nat-
ural ground of our “aiming at truth,” is oriented toward the 
improvement of the understanding and human chara er. 
Its significance is not diminished because of the distance of 
Hume’s theory from the question of an objective truth, for as 
Owens (2003, p. 287) states: “Rational belief is rarely based 
on conclusive evidence”. Nonetheless, and from a certain tech-
nical per ective, Hume’s epistemological approach is weak, 
because relevant questions, such as how much evidence, be-
yond his very general demarcation criteria, is necessary to 
call a belief “true”, are never settled. This lack of tidiness also 
shows that Hume’s first concern was neither epistemological 
nor logical, but rather moral in the broad sense of the word.
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